Cooperative acts is widely observed in nature. Because cooperation allows individuals to choose their associations based on differences in fitness opportunities, such behaviors directly influence population dynamics. Cooperative acts can be classified into two types: facultative and obligate. Facultative cooperation seen in starling murmurations, fish schools, and locust swarms grant the actors full choice over their associations since the consequences of non-cooperation are not severe. Obligate cooperation like that of canids, cetaceans, primates, and eusocial insects only grant partial actor choice as the consequences of non-cooperation are more severe. The population dynamics of facultative cooperative species are well-modeled, but not so for obligate co-operators. In this paper, we model and analyze the population dynamics of obligate cooperators by embedding a game theoretic behavioral dynamic into a within group population dynamic with additional between group dynamics. Our model confirms previous results showing within group cooperation leading to unstable population dynamics and go further by showing that more groups lead to greater population instability. Our behavioral analysis also shows that stable population equilibria will lead to behavioral instabilities. From there, we generalize our results to show that obligate cooperative species can never achieve full stability due to the fundamental mismatch between the stability of the behavioral equilibrium (ESS) and the stability of the population size equilibrium. Our results, general enough to apply to most systems, show that the constant group turnover seen in obligately cooperative species are not necessarily a function of external stochastic events but instead inherent to their dynamics.
Introduction effects within groups. We assume that individuals cannot unilaterally move from one group to another but can move when a certain requirement is met. We separately analyze the population dynamics and the behavioral dynamics of the model before combining the two. From there, we relax our assumptions and generalize our analysis to include movement between groups based on individual choice. In this case, we show that a stable population size is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for individual choice and that at the ESS for individual choice, population dynamics cannot be fully stable. The model can result in a stable equilibrium of choice dynamics or population dynamics but never both. We provide candidate examples from nature of our modeled dynamics and suggest future applications for this new model.
Model Dynamics

Population Dynamics
To first understand the population dynamics of obligately cooperative societies, we construct and analyze a simple mathematical model inspired by the biology of obligate cooperators, e.g. meerkats, naked mole rats, social weavers, social spiders, elephants, etc. We imagine a site filled with multiple herds or groups. Each group has its own population dynamics in which fitness is defined as per-capita growth rate (measured as average individual reproduction).
The fitness function (per capita growth rate) for each group is given by equation (1).
shared space by all groups). For the sake of tractability, we imagine that all individuals are identical, distinguished only by whether they are within or outside the group and that each group possesses the same fitness function with the same parameters. This leads to two assumptions: that all individuals within a group are uniform in fitness and that it is only the number of individuals and not the properties of the individual that determines fitness within a group. Since all individuals are identical, all groups have the same fitness function allowing us to rescale percapita growth rates by (Fig. 1b) (Allee, 1931; Allee, 1938) . The first two terms of equation (2) define these intra-group dynamics where the first term represents the fitness benefits of group living and the second term represents the fitness costs. We imagine that individual benefits of group living and cooperation, such as foraging, defense, or other positive social interactions increases linearly while fitness costs, such as resource sharing and disease, increase super-linearly, specifically quadratically. This set-up is in keeping with the schematic illustrated by Terborgh (1983) . So long as
‫ݔ‬ ൏ ‫ܯ‬
, the benefits of cooperation are greater than the costs of competition and so fitness is positive; and if
‫ݔ‬ ൏ ெ ଶ
, then the benefits of additional cooperation are greater than the costs of additional competition, an individual's marginal contribution is positive, and the Allee effect holds. The third term of equation (2) represents loss of fitness due to inter-group competition and is broadly assumed to be linear.
We now take a look at how groups might interact with each other via intra-group population dynamics. This analysis replicates the same results from Wang et al. (1999) , revealing the same qualitative results with minor differences. Therefore, we go through this section fairly briefly. With a single group, they dynamics are quite clear. There are two equilibria:
The first equilibrium is unstable, the second is stable. Therefore, any group with positive size will grow or shrink to ‫ܯ‬ (Fig. 3a, b, c .
Competition between two groups now induces a strong Allee effect with results dependent upon the strength of inter-group competition ߙ (Fig. 2) With two groups, instability occurs first from the inherent advantage accruing to the group with the larger population size (inter-group competition) and later the within group dynamic associated with the Allee effect and extinction threshold. As we add additional groups, the same fundamental dynamics remain. The only difference is that inter-group competition must be ever weaker for the interior equilibrium to be locally stable. Specifically, inter-group competition must be scaled by a multiple of ଵ ି ଵ where ݇ is the number of groups to achieve the same dynamics. Inter-group competition must be lower and lower if an interior equilibrium is to maintain its stability as groups are added. If not, then the addition of more groups destabilizes the interior equilibrium and ensures the extinction of some groups.
With population dynamics in hand, we now turn to behavioral dynamics.
Behavioral Dynamics
A behavioral game of association can be embedded into equation (2). Individuals may want leave their present group and join another so as to increase their fitness. Since each individual is identical, only group size determines the fitness of each member. Coalition game theory can tell us how associations will form or disband based upon the payoff to the individuals.
We make the key assumption that individuals have limited information. Specifically, we assume that individuals only know how fitness changes with the size of the individual's group, i.e. the marginal contribution of an additional memberto average fitness. fitness. In the case of strictly competitive models, the association function will always be negative as each extra individual decreases the fitness of others (Fig. 1d) . With the addition of the Allee effect, the association function now has domains where it is positive (Fig 1c) . In our model, the association function is:
It starts at a positive point which divides strong competition further into moderately strong and extremely strong. These three strengths of competition -extremely strong, moderately strong, and weak -correspond to the dynamics of total extinction, unstable equilibria, and group turnover respectively.
Total Extinction and Unstable Equilibria
Starting with a single group, it will grow to size meaning both groups will decline in size and decline simultaneously due to the groups' equal sizes. The decline in size of the focal group will cause individual fitness to lower for that group, but the decline of the other group will also cause the fitness of individuals of the focal group to rise due to release from inter-group competition. Since both groups shrink at the same time, the balance between the rise and fall of fitness governs whether the groups will reach a positive equilibrium group size less than . This population is of a finite size and will be reached after some period of time, meaning that there will be eventual cycles with groups forming and being extirpated (Fig. 4) .
Additional Dynamics
Using a more general version of the model (see SI), we can reveal two new dynamics:
budding and multiple splitting. In our model, the fitness function was symmetrical on the interval Because not all groups are necessarily of the same size, the dynamics are generally harder to analyze but should follow the same basic format of total extinction, unstable equilibria, and group turnover. We refer the readers to the supplementary information for full analysis of this section.
General Argument of Instability
Here, we present the general argument that no cooperative society can achieve a fully stable population equilibrium through the embedding of a behavioral game within fitness dynamics. We keep the majority of our earlier assumptions but now allow individuals to join groups and behavioral dynamics to occur regardless of whether or not a group is at a population equilibrium. We present this argument two ways: first verbally, then mathematically.
Verbal Presentation
Within the population dynamics of obligately cooperative species, there is a behavioral Each individual's most preferred state is at a local fitness maximum. If the group is in a cooperative state, then the group will not wish to reduce members and instead will willingly accept members if available. If the group is in a competitive state though, a reduced group size gives the members greater fitness which they will seek by removing members. Therefore, the stable behavioral equilibrium for a group happens when the individuals are at a local fitness maximum or barring that the group is in a cooperative state; if not, then the size of the group will change and the group will not be at a behavioral equilibrium.
A stable population equilibrium for a single group occurs when fitness is 0 and the marginal contribution to fitness is negative, i.e. a competitive state. In a multi-group system, this has to happen for at least one group for the entire system to be stable with regards to population dynamics. Therefore, a stable population size cannot also be a stable behavioral equilibrium for at least one of the groups. We can also say that if all groups are cooperative or at local maxima i.e. at a stable behavioral equilibirum, then the system will not be at a stable population size.
Therefore, there is always a mismatch between a stable behavioral equilibrium and a stable population size.
We now present this formally in a mathematical framework. Through a verbal and mathematical argument, we have shown that the population dynamics of obligately cooperative species will exist in constant flux and instability.
Mathematical Presentation
Let
Discussion
While we are not the first to note that local extinctions and extirpations occur in population dynamics due to the Allee effect, we have shown them to be intrinsic and unavoidable to the dynamics of obligately cooperative species. In ecological systems, it has been welldocumented that obligately cooperative species do not show stable population dynamics and instead show constant group turnover (Jarvis et al., 1994; Aviles, 1997; Clutton-Brock et al., 1999) with external factors often raised as the reasons for these dynamics. Our findings join other mathematical analysis in generalizing the phenomenon to an intrinsic factor of obligately cooperative species.
Many mathematical hypotheses have been developed to explain why the population dynamics of cooperators are intrinsically unstable. Aviles (1999) noted that cooperation can magnify reproductive output, leading to oscillations and chaotic behavior -and ultimately extinction -of a group while Chourchamp et al. (1999) and Wang et al. (1999) both show the importance of a within group extinction threshold. Our results align more so with the hypotheses of Wang et al. (1999) and . We extend upon their work to show that this extinction threshold will always appear due to intergroup competition regardless of whether the Allee effect is deemed strong or weak in its absence and that more groups leads to greater instability. With the addition of a behavioral game of association, we show that new groups will always be created, leading to instabilities and a collapse of group numbers. Among all these mathematical hypotheses, our results goes a step further by saying that these dynamics are not only intrinsic but unavoidable.
In addition, our results show that constant group turnover arise from a non-chaotic deterministic interactions. This means the localized group extinctions are a general, repeatable, and predictable pattern against which field studies and data can be tested. Using simulations and controlled experiments, we can now tease how attributes and traits of species along with environmental variables can affect the cooperative species' population dynamics (see Future Directions).
Short-Term Intergroup Dynamics
According to coalition game theory, individuals of a larger group will split off to form their own smaller groups if they can gain greater rewards. This exact dynamic is seen when the Allee effect is incorporated into a population model. With the Allee effect, there is now a nonzero optimal group size. Once the group size is beyond that point, there is a strong incentive for the group to split. We are not the first to understand that group splitting can occur due to an Allee effect. Crema (2014) used this exact process to understand human settlement dynamics in a simulation model. As well, fission-fusion group dynamics, permanent or otherwise, are a wellstudied aspect of cooperative societies with examples ranging from ants, to cetaceans, to humans.
It must be noted that our assumptions for splitting are different from standard coalition game theory. In standard coalition game theory, players are rational (they wish to maximize their fitness), have perfect information (knowledge of the state of all groups and the environment as a whole), and the number of players is fixed. Under standard assumptions, groups will not split if competition is strong enough to force fitness at optimal group size negative, i.e. Mutually Assured Destruction. These assumptions are not biologically realistic. While players may be rational (evolution assures it), players do not have perfect information especially about the future. If players only have information about their own group, Mutually Assured Destruction cannot prevent group splitting. As well, in biological systems, the number of players is not fixed;
reducing the numbers of individuals within a coalition may be one way to raise individual fitness. Infanticide is common in many species, and chimpanzees, spider monkeys, and southern muriquis can participate in lethal intragroup aggression (Kaburu et al., 2013; Valero et al., 2006; Campbell, 2006; Talebi et al., 2009 ). Using our more biologically reasonable assumptions, coalitions are more likely to split when the group is in a competitive state.
We see many examples of group splitting in nature. For example, in primates, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) groups will divide along genealogies, and subordinate male and female macaques will form subgroups that eventually permanently leave to establish their own group (Chepko-Sade and Sade, 1979; Dittus, 1988) . In other social mammals, such as lions, individuals will leave natal groups to create new smaller groups (Pusey and Packer, 1987) .
Honey bees, having reached maximum capacity in a hive, will split through the swarming process into two or more groups as one leaves to find a new hive. Splitting of social groups may also lead to long-range dispersal of animals; such is seen in the dispersal of sponges, male hyenas, and invasive Argentine Ants (Blanquer et al., 2009; Holekamp et al., 1993; Suarez et al. 2000) . Long-range dispersal is an important mechanism of biological invasions and dispersal due to splitting may provide further insight to the implications of Allee effects in biological invasions (Lodge, 1993; Taylor and Hastings, 2005) . Researchers often explain group splitting by external environmental factors and increases to an individual's reproductive success. Our model corroborates with the latter, suggesting that group splitting will occur regardless of external environmental factors.
Long-Term Intergroup Dynamics
Over time, the process of groups growing and splitting results in the long-term population dynamics of that species. Under conditions of strong inter-group competition, our model illustrates an initial split followed by both groups simultaneously shrinking to extinction or some unstable equilibrial state. To see these two phenomena on a global scale is extremely unlikely.
Instead, these dynamics are likely to be seen quite locally. If inter-group competition is spatially dependent, then a group that splits into two, only to remain close, might compete strongly with each, leading to one or both of their extinctions. Rather, on a larger scale, we are much more likely to see the group turnover our model exhibits under conditions of weak inter-group competition. Over longer time scales, our model shows oscillation of total population over time with repeated instances extirpations and splitting events (Fig. 4) .
With weak inter-group competition, our model shows oscillatory patterns at the scale of the total population, a feature commonly seen in social animals. Such oscillations are well documented for Isle Royale National Park wolves over nearly 3 decades and similar dynamics are occurring since the re-introduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park (Peterson and Page, 1988; Ripple and Beschta 2012) . Others include large primates, wild dogs, elephants, mole-rats, mongooses, and spiders (Kalpers et al., 2003; Burrows, 1991; Armbruster and Lande, 1993; Parker and Graham 1989; Jarvis et al., 1994; Aviles, 1997; Clutton-Brock et al., 1999) . It is important to distinguish that the oscillations observed here occur at the scale of the total population and are not due simply fluctuations in the groups' size. These oscillations come about through the growth-splitting-extinction process of individual groups. The Damaraland mole-rats in particular display a process much like ours with smaller, newly-founded groups more likely to die out due to competition from larger, more established groups (Jarvis et al., 1994) . Jane
Goodall recorded the extirpation of the Kahama chimpanzee group due to inter-group competition in 1977, supporting our results that inter-group competition is the driving factor of group extinction and extirpation (Goodall 1986 ).
Many long term population studies focus on the overall population and do not account for group extirpations leading researchers to seek external environmental causes as reasons. 
Stabilizing Influences
Our analysis shows that population dynamics of cooperative societies are inherently unstable. That said, there are stabilizing factors that can prevent excessive group splitting and turnover. The first and most important is a fusion process. The main reason for group turnover is that groups smaller than the extinction threshold will go extinct. If these groups can fuse into larger groups, then they can escape extinction by being greater than the extinction threshold as well as reducing intergroup competition. By including the ability for groups to fuse, the system should generally move from a state of group turnover to a partially stable equilibrium (see SI for a specific example). It must be noted though that even with fusion, population dynamics are still not fully stable.
There also may be costs associated with splitting. These costs may be in the future, such as Mutually Assured Destruction as previously discussed, or present costs, like intragroup conflict which temporarily delays and/or suppresses the fitness of the individuals. Individuals with a very high discount rate may see the splitting process as too costly compared to potential future rewards. This may delay or prevent splitting in groups, engendering stability to the system.
Additional phenomena can stabilize the population dynamics of cooperative species but only exist in theoretical realms (see SI for these examples). Overall, with our assumptions, only few biologically relevant processes can partially stabilize these dynamics, and it seems no process can fully stabilize the system.
Conservation Implications
The conservation implications of inherent instability due to the Allee effect are great for the conservation of obligately cooperative species. and Courchamp et al. (2008) both draw attention to conservation and the Allee effect, especially focusing on Allee effects in context of species exploitation, habitat loss, and habitat fragmentation. While the Allee effect is often thought of occurring at small population sizes, pushing them to extinction, negative density dependence can occur at both large and small population sizes (Courchamp et al. 2008) resulting in important short and long term population dynamics which should be considered for conservation efforts. Courchamp et al. (2008) investigated consequences of fragmentation and isolation on populations experiencing Allee effects and concluded risk for extinction was high for small and very small populations regardless of isolation.
Our results point to four main effects that have significant implications for the conservation of cooperative species. Firstly, these dynamics will happen regardless of the environmental conditions, and as such, greater environmental stability will not ultimately prevent group extinction or collapse. Robust, and not stable, populations should be the goal. Secondly, the average overall population size over time will be smaller than the potential carrying capacity, and the overall population more prone to total extinction due to the constant fluctuations.
Therefore, maximizing overall population is critical. Thirdly, there must be a sufficiently large population to allow smaller groups to fuse. The smaller the group, the more likely it is to be below their internal extinction threshold. By fusing, these smaller groups can avoid the extinction threshold which also has the benefit of boosting average overall population size. And lastly, stronger inter-group competition is more likely to lead to unstable dynamics. Diminished resources and lack of territory between groups can enhance competition and lead to greater instability.
All four of the reasons point to the disproportionate impact that habitat fragmentation and loss has on obligate cooperative species. Often conservation practices are implemented over smaller scales, with protection for species being implemented in a distinct area of land or for a specific group of that species. Instead, protections must be implemented over as single large conservation areas over several small ones (SLOSS) (MacArthur and Wilson 1967 , Diamond 1975 , Simberloff and Abele 1982 . A single large conservation area will not only help mitigate issues such as inbreeding depression, but also help stabilize population dynamics. Large conservation areas which cover multiple groups will ensure there is minimal inter-group competition, a population large and spread out enough to withstand any negative environmental stochasticity, and a robust fusion process to stabilize population dynamics.
In addition, while much has been learned from the social structure of species of high conservation concern (Pusey et al. 2007 ), our findings suggest future research and conservation efforts should add inter-group dynamics as a major driver for maintaining species population.
Future directions
We provide a basic model to derive and understand the population dynamics of obligately cooperative species, but like any model, it does not fully address many of these species attributes. Many of the assumptions we make are simple, especially that all individuals are uniform and identical. Fitness is not identical among all members of a group, with breeding often reserved for specific members, and not all types of members are equally valuable. As well, we do not explicitly have a hierarchical organization among members of a group. We also make the assumption that the group members only leave when all fitness is at zero. Many times group members leave or are ejected before then, now faced with joining an established group or banding together with other ejected members to create a new group. How adding these attributes affects the population dynamics remains to be seen but should not affect the general argument of instability as it is a statement on the state of the population structure at a single point in time and not the dynamics.
As well as more realistic assumptions, we can also add more interesting features to the model to understand other aspects of obligately group dynamics. Such features would include meta-population dynamics, source-sink dynamics, evolution, spatial effects, limited resources, Figure 4 . After the second splitting event, the light blue group that goes extinct has a larger maximal group size and larger initial size (and therefore exerts greater competitive force) but a smaller growth rate than either the purple or gold group which persist. This suggests that a higher growth rate is more important against competition than a larger group size. This lines up with the hypothesis that the evolution of eusociality and division of reproductive work is due group competition (Reeve and Hölldobler, 2007) .
Conclusion
In summary, our analysis shows that the population dynamics of cooperative species are inherently unstable. In the case most likely to be seen in nature, population dynamics result in the constant turnover of smaller groups splitting off from established ones. While this model is simple, its applications are great. It can be used towards modelling swarming in bees or the colonization of wolves in Isle Royale and Yellowstone National Park (Oldroyd et al., 1997; Peterson and Page, 1988) . More importantly, this work is the starting point for further analysis of cooperative species population dynamics. Additional modifications could be added on to the model to get at a truer picture of how these dynamics occur including asymmetric competition, spatial effects, and evolutionary dynamics which will help to enrich our knowledge of population dynamics of cooperative species. Practically, this is important because a significant number of species from cetaceans, canids, and primates to lions, elephants, eusocial insects, and even sponges show cooperative societies in which groups are tight-knit and discrete. Because these species often have a significant impact on the ecosystem, whether through ecosystem engineering, their status as keystone species, or accounting for a significant percentage of the biomass of the ecosystem (in some species, all three), it is imperative that ecologists understand the population dynamics of these species (Jones et al., 1994; Ripple and Beschta, 2012; Hoelldolber and Wilson, 1990) . Better knowledge will help ecologists and wildlife conservations better manage and save their populations and the ecosystems in which they live . 
